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Governance in the Public Corporation of the
Future: The Battle for Control of
Corporate Governance
Z. Jill Barclift*
Eight years after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Congress has again passed sweeping legislation in response to a
corporate crisis.1 In addition to changes in the regulatory
environment for Wall Street financial firms and banks, the DoddFrank Act (D-F Act) also proposes reforms to corporate
governance.2 Before passage of the D-F Act, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) began rulemaking on several
governance matters addressed by Congress in the D-F Act;
however, the SEC will begin rulemaking on many of the new
corporate governance mandates over the next six to twelve
months.3 As federal securities laws and rulemakings continue to
define corporate governance requirements, the new rules raise
anew a discussion of what is (or perhaps what should be) the
balance between state corporate law and federal securities laws
in regulating corporate governance for public corporations.4
As Congress, the SEC, and national exchanges continue to
develop rulemaking on director independence, compliance
processes, disclosures, and leadership structure, any concerns
over further intrusion of federal securities laws into state

Z. Jill Barclift, Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of
Law.
1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
3 Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv., 112th Cong. 6–8 (2011)
(statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission),
available
at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&
FileStore_id=d1bd7e59-137a-4d00-93d0-8ede516f52a0.
4 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592 (2003)
(discussing the race to the bottom in corporate law, and how the “federal authorities set
the broad boundaries—of an uncertain and changing demarcation—within which the
states can move”); Richard A. Booth, The Emerging Conflict Between Federal Securities
Law and State Corporation Law, 12 J. CORP. L. 73, 74 (1986) (discussing the “implication
of the dependence of the federal law of disclosure upon the state law of fiduciary duty is
that when state law changes, so will federal law”); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock,
Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1575
(2005) (discussing the relation between federal and state corporate lawmaking).
*
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corporate governance are perhaps moot as the proverbial “camel’s
nose” has already penetrated the tent.5 Even federalists have
begun to accept that not only does Congress have the right to
regulate public corporations, but also that it will do so when
investors lobby for federal rules to address fraud or other
governance failures.6 However, notwithstanding federal efforts
to impose additional governance mandates, most corporate
governance covering the relationship between shareholders and
management remains firmly within the purview of state
corporate law.7 Perhaps, the more narrow issue then becomes
not whether we are headed toward a federal system of
governance for public companies, but whether the intrusion by
federal securities laws into state governance matters are
beneficial to shareholders.
In this Article, I examine the latest governance mandates
under the D-F Act. In particular, this Article focuses on the
disclosure requirements on the CEO and chairman positions, and
argues that disclosures of whether the CEO is also the chairman
benefit shareholders’ governance rights under state law. The
new provisions under the D-F Act combined with recent SEC
disclosure rulemaking on board leadership structure address a
fundamental issue of board decision-making and the affects of
structural bias and “group think” on director behavior.
Bifurcation
disclosures
for
public
companies
provide
shareholders with beneficial information on board leadership
structure, but more importantly, the disclosure requirements
force directors to engage in discussion and analysis of how board
decisions are made, and whether such decisions can be unduly
influenced by a dominant CEO.
State fiduciary duty
requirements do not directly address social and structural
decision-making biases.
Shareholders benefit when federal
disclosure rules address state governance shortcomings that are
not otherwise conducive to private ordering.
Part I of this Article explains the complimentary
relationship between federal and state law, and looks at how
securities laws focus on disclosure and state laws focus on
fiduciary duties to protect shareholders from management
misconduct. This part looks at how Congress and the SEC use

5 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 620 (1991); Z. Jill Barclift, Codes of Ethics and State Fiduciary Duties:
Where is the Line?, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 237, 258 (2008).
6 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington:
Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1084
(2008).
7 Id. at 1081.
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federal disclosure mandates to affect behavioral changes in board
and management conduct.
Part II examines recent efforts by the SEC to influence board
and management governance prior to the passage of the D-F Act.
This part looks at 2010 SEC rulemaking on risk, compensation,
and governance; focusing specifically on the governance
rulemaking on disclosure requirements for the CEO and
chairman positions. This part discusses the rationale for the
rulemaking to address leadership and structural biases in board
decision-making, and why board structure influences board
decision-making.
Part II also explores briefly the provisions of the D-F Act
related to corporate governance and looks at which provisions
use disclosure to effect corporate governance changes. While this
part briefly identifies and explains other corporate governance
provisions in the D-F Act, the focus is on the provisions of the DF Act that provide Congressional support of the SEC’s efforts to
influence board leadership and structural bias by examining the
legislative history of the bifurcation provisions in the Act.
Part III explores the meaning of structural bias and groupthink. This part examines the social nature of boards, how such
influences affect leadership structure, and why federal
bifurcation rules may benefit shareholders.
Part IV explores Delaware’s approach to structural bias and
group-think in board decision-making. This part looks at the
difficulty shareholders face in trying to demonstrate the
governance harm when directors’ decision-making is influenced
by group-think and CEO dominance. This part argues that
federal disclosures on bifurcation forces directors to assess its
leadership structure for structural biases and that the D-F Act’s
and the SEC’s disclosure mandates benefit shareholders.
I. THE COMPLIMENTARY RELATIONSHIP: FEDERAL AND STATE
CORPORATE LAW
The relationship between federal securities laws and state
corporate law is best described as synergistic and
complimentary.8 Federal securities laws and regulations, with
their emphasis on public disclosures and financial reporting, are
complimentary to state law’s focus on the relationships between
shareholders and corporate managers, and the fiduciary
obligations of the board.9 Recognizing the complimentary order

8
9

Id. at 1080–81.
Id.; Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism:
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of federal and state law, Congress has been careful not to intrude
into areas reserved for state governance while carving out
disclosure rules, which enables shareholders to make informed
decisions.10 The D-F Act provides an example of how Congress
balances disclosure with state fiduciary obligations of directors.
Language in the D-F Act on non-binding shareholders’ vote on
executive compensation specifically provides a rule of
construction in which the non-binding shareholders’ vote does not
overrule a decision by the board, create or imply a change to
fiduciary duties, or create additional fiduciary duties for
directors.11
Notwithstanding the complimentary relationship of state
and federal rules, the D-F Act and recent SEC rulemaking
continue to demonstrate the effective use of disclosure rules to
influence corporate governance.12
Corporate governance
requirements remain within states’ regulatory purview and
Delaware remains the dominant state for public company
incorporation.13
However, it is the truce between federal
securities laws and Delaware corporate law, which continues to
illustrate how governance, in particular fiduciary duties,
develops in response to Congress’ desire to act in the face of
corporate crises.14 History suggests that Congress acts in
response to public pressures for reform.15 Correspondingly,
Delaware reacts by either amending its corporate laws or further
defining fiduciary obligations of directors.16 As Leo Strine writes,
“why the American model of corporate governance has served
investors so well is the synergies that arise from the combination
of a strong regulatory structure governing public disclosures and
Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1, 3–4 (2005) (discussing the origins of
corporate governance federalism).
10 E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 443–44 (2003) (discussing
how federal law, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, does not completely supplant state law);
Griffith & Steele, supra note 9, at 4.
11 Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance, COVINGTON & BURLING
LLP, 2 (July 21, 2010), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/0fd9af21-04a7-4537-9d8ebbc47050e295/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e413a276-e87e-4af5-ac29bfebc5f100ec/Dodd-Frank%20Act%20%20Executive%20Compensation%20and%
20Corporate%20Governance.pdf.
12 Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism in the Administrative State: The SEC’s
Discretion to Move the Line Between the State and Federal Realms of Corporate
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1180–83 (2007).
13 Mark J. Roe, Is Delaware’s Corporate Law Too Big to Fail?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 75,
76–77 (2008) (discussing Delaware’s dominance in corporate law, including explanations
for its dominance).
14 Id. at 82 (discussing how Congress’ response to corporate crises affects Delaware
law rather than the law of other states due to its dominance in corporate law).
15 Id. at 83.
16 Id.
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financial integrity, and a more nimble and enabling state law
approach to the relations between corporate managers and
stockholders.”17
Yet, as Congress and the SEC continue to respond to
investor concerns over management misconduct and board
failures, new regulations and rules requiring disclosures on
governance processes directly impact governance matters
traditionally covered by state law.18 Recent SEC rules and the
governance provisions in the D-F Act continue to use disclosure
as the way to compel boards to implement changes to their
governance processes.19
Before describing the D-F Act’s
governance provisions, it is necessary to examine rulemaking on
governance by the SEC enacted prior to passage of the D-F Act
and what effect the D-F Act may have on the SEC’s rulemaking.
II. SEC RULES ON ENHANCED DISCLOSURE ABOUT RISK,
COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Prior to passage of the D-F Act, effective in February 2010,
the SEC implemented rulemaking covering board risk
assessment, executive compensation, and corporate governance.20
The new rules require disclosure of a company’s compensation
policies and risk management; disclosure on the experience,
qualifications, attributes or skills of the director; disclosures
about each director’s experience at other public companies,
including involvement in any legal proceedings; disclosure of how
diversity is considered in the director nomination process;
disclosure information about the role of the board’s oversight of
risk and leadership structure, including whether the company
has combined or separated the chairman and CEO position, and
why the company believes this structure is appropriate; quicker
shareholder voting results; revisions to disclosure on director
compensation; and disclosure about compensation consultants
including fees paid to the consultant.21
The SEC’s stated goal in adopting the new rules was to
improve information in annual reports and proxy statements to
give shareholders improved information to evaluate board
leadership.22 The D-F Act gave Congressional approval to many

Strine, supra note 6, at 1080.
Thompson, supra note 12, at 1180.
See generally Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release Nos. 339089; 34-62275 (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/
33-9089.pdf.
20 Id. at 39–45.
21 Id. at 29–45.
22 Id. at 4.
17
18
19
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of the rulemaking provisions put forth in the SEC’s rulemaking
on proxy disclosure enhancements.23 It is therefore unclear what
adjustments the SEC must make to its prior rulemaking in order
to satisfy the requirements under the D-F Act or whether there
will be additional disclosure requirements. Although the D-F Act
addressed systemic risk issues for the financial system, the SEC,
as part of its 2010 rulemaking, issued rules to address the
board’s role in monitoring systemic risk.24
A. SEC’s Disclosure on Risk Management and New
Compensation Committee Rules
The SEC mandated that companies disclose the board’s role
in risk oversight, and whether such policies “are reasonably
likely to have a material adverse effect on the company.”25 The
new rules require companies to disclose and evaluate their
compensation policies and practices for all employees (including
non-executive officers) and assess whether there are any risks
associated with those compensation policies and practices.26 The
purpose of the disclosure is to assist investors in determining
whether a company has compensation incentives, which may lead
to aggressive risk-taking by employees.27
The types of examples provided by the SEC for disclosure
include: design of compensation policies and practices for
employees whose behavior is most affected by compensation
incentives and how such policies may relate to risk taking by the
employees; how the company considers risk assessment in
designing compensation incentives; explanation of how the
company’s compensation policies and practices may lead to risk
taking by employees in both the short term and long term; any
policies or changes to such policies regarding changes to
compensation practices to adjust to risk profiles; and procedures
to monitor risk policies and practices to determine whether its
risk objectives are being met.28
These disclosures will require boards to inform shareholders
how they monitor the level of risk taken by not just corporate
executives, but all employees.29 Boards will be better able to
identify and address risky decisions by the chief executive, which

23 Alert SEC Disclosure and Corporate Governance, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP,
4 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.weil.com/files/upload/Weil_Alert_SEC_CG_April_4_2011.pdf.
24 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 1.
25 Id. at 5.
26 Id. at 8.
27 Id. at 9.
28 Id. at 15–16.
29 Id. at 8–9.
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may be driven by the CEO’s compensation goals rather than the
best interest of the corporation.30 Improved risk management
disclosures complement state fiduciary law by reinforcing good
faith deliberations by the board.31 Knowing that shareholders
will be looking at its disclosures to see if the board’s risk policies
reward executives who take excessive risk with excessive
compensation, directors will be careful to consider management
decisions and engage in more open discord concerning
management strategies.32
The combined new disclosures on compensation committee
independence, executive compensation and risk management
disclosures, and disclosures on the separation of CEO and
chairman positions directly address issues of structural biases in
board decision-making. The D-F Act provided Congressional
approval of the SEC’s rulemaking on board leadership
structure.33 The SEC’s rationale for implementing bifurcation
rules are explained below.
B. SEC Rulemaking on Board Leadership Structure
Under the SEC’s rulemaking, companies are required to
disclose why it has chosen to combine the positions of chairman
and CEO and the reasons why the company believes this board
leadership structure is appropriate for the company.34 If the
company combines the roles, but selects an independent lead
director to chair meetings of independent directors, then the
company must disclose why it has a lead director and the role the
lead independent director plays in leadership of the company.35
The disclosures are not intended to influence a company’s
leadership structure decisions; however, the purpose is to inform
investors of the management’s explanation for its board
leadership structure, and to provide insight into the board’s
communication and the degree to which the board is able to
exercise independent judgment about management.36
The SEC’s rulemaking on governance remains within the
traditional boundary of disclosure and financial integrity for
federal rules. The disclosure function of the new bifurcation rule
is consistent with recent federal efforts to influence director

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 81 (discussing the benefits of the new disclosure about board leadership
structure and the board’s role in risk oversight).
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Do Not Delete

8

12/7/2011 2:17 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:1

behavior by mandating disclosures, notwithstanding the SEC’s
insistence that it did not intend to influence leadership structure
decisions by the board.37
In response to investor concerns to perceived governance
failures, the D-F Act includes several provisions to address
governance lapses and enhance disclosure obligations of boards.38
Congress’ stated goals in passing legislation to further
governance enhancements are to address the perceived failures
of corporate governance in monitoring risk management and the
governance failures.39 The D-F Act provisions covering overall
corporate governance is addressed below.
C. Dodd-Frank Act: Governance Provisions
The pertinent section of the D-F Act concerning corporate
governance is Title IX, Subtitles E and G.40 The provisions give
shareholders proxy access by requiring a shareholder’s vote to
approve executive compensation, disclosure on executive
compensation and financial performance of the company and
recovery of erroneously awarded compensation; disclosure on
director and employee hedging; call for rules on independence of
compensation committee members and their consultants; and
disclosure on bifurcation of chairman and chief executive officer
positions.41 Below are synopses of each governance provision and
its stated goal in improving governance for shareholders.
D. Proxy Access: “Say on Pay”
Among the more talked about governance provisions are the
so-called “say on pay” requirements.42 The D-F Act authorizes
the SEC to issue non-binding rules for shareholders’ voting on
executive compensation by giving shareholders greater
37 Josh Wright, Stephen Bainbridge on Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral
Analysis, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 7, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/
2010/12/07/stephen-bainbridge-on-mandatory-disclosure-a-behavioral-analysis/ (discussing how “mandatory disclosure is a—maybe the—defining characteristic of U.S. securities
regulation”);; Thompson, supra note 12, at 1181–82 (discussing that if shareholder access
rules were implemented, the federalism issue would likely disappear); Z. Jill Barclift,
supra note 5, at 250 (discussing how federal securities law regulates disclosure).
38 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 42.
39 CCH ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 420–21 (Aspen Pub.
2010).
40 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
§§ 951-57, 971-79, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1907, 1915-26 (2010) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
41 Id.
42 Lucian A. Bebchuk, & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate,
65 BUS. LAW. 329 (Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 653, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513408 (discussing proxy access).
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participation
in
executive
compensation
decisions.43
Shareholders are given an advisory vote on executive
compensation; however, shareholders are not permitted to
micromanage executive compensation by setting limits and are
limited to the right to express an opinion.44 The purpose of the
vote is to give shareholders information on compensation
practices so that shareholders can evaluate whether such
practices are in the shareholders’ best interests.45 Among the
concerns expressed by Congress in passing these provisions was
the desire to increase transparency and accountability, and to
reinforce executive performance by rewarding short-term gain
without penalizing for long-term consequences of decisions.46
The disclosures on pay versus performance require the SEC
to develop proxy rules that provide an explanation of
compensation and include information showing the connection
between
executive
compensation
paid
and
company
performance.47
Additionally, information on total median
compensation of all employees, annual total compensation of the
CEO, and a ratio comparing the CEOs total compensation to the
median compensation of all employees must be disclosed.48 The
purpose of these disclosures is to improve the information
provided to shareholders so that investors are informed about the
relationship between executive pay and performance and can
make comparisons with overall medians and assess what
executives are being paid when the company’s performance is
failing.49
The SEC addressed some of these enhanced
compensation disclosure requirements in rulemaking effective
February 2010 and will likely issue additional rulemaking to
comply with the D-F Act requirements.50
43 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951-57; CCH
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 420–23.
44 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951; CCH
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 421–23.
45 CCH ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 421–22 (“Shareholders have
raised concerns about large bonus plans in situation which they, as the company’s owners
have experienced loss.”).
46 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 133–34 (2010).
47 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 971; CCH
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 430–31.
48 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953; S. REP. NO.
111-176, at 135.
49 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953; S. REP. NO.
111-176, at 135.
50 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 1 (discussing that the
amendments to these rules enhance the “information provided in connection with proxy
solicitations and in other reports filed with the Commission”). The SEC issued a press
release in January, 2011 adopting rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute
Compensation in compliance with Dodd-Frank Act. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule on Say on Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as
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E. Executive Compensation: “Claw Backs”
The D-F Act imposes a requirement that public companies
develop and disclose policies that, in the event the company is
required to prepare an accounting restatement resulting from
material noncompliance with financial reporting requirements,
the company will recover from the executive officer any incentive
compensation received.51
Congress’ intent was to require
companies to recover executive compensation received due to lack
of compliance with applicable reporting requirements so that
shareholders would not have to resort to costly litigation to
recover erroneously paid compensation.52
F.

Disclosures on Hedging
The disclosures on hedging by employees and directors
require shareholders to receive information in any annual proxy
solicitation on whether employees or directors are permitted to
purchase hedging financial instruments.53 The purpose of this
disclosure is so that investors know whether employees or
directors have hedged any compensation granted to them in the
event the company fails to meet its financial targets.54
G. Independent Compensation Committee
Another noteworthy provision in the Act is the independence
requirements for compensation committee members and
consultants.55 The legislative history of the D-F Act suggests
that Congress was not only concerned with disclosure, but also
equally concerned with corporate governance processes.56
Mandating the independence of key committees is not a new
approach by Congress to deal with board decision-making;
Congress, the SEC, and Exchange Act rules require independent
audit committees and set forth parameters defining the meaning

Required under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2011/2011-25.htm.
51 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954; S. REP. NO.
111-176, at 135–36.
52 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 135–36. “It has become apparent that a significant
concern of shareholders is the relationship between executive pay and the company’s
financial performance for the benefit of shareholders.” Id. at 135.
53 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 955; CCH
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 427.
54 CCH ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 427.
55 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 423–25. “Independence” is not defined in the
legislation, but rather that determination is left to the exchanges and associations. Id. at
423.
56 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 137.
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of “independent.”57
Similarly, the new requirements for
independent directors on the compensation committee are
consistent with prior federal governance rules on board
committee structures.58
The D-F Act mandates that members of the compensation
committee be independent board members.59 The D-F Act leaves
to the SEC the requirement of issuing rules for the national
exchanges to prohibit listing companies that do not meet the
compensation committee independence requirements.60
The
exchanges must consider certain factors when defining
independence, including the source of the director’s compensation
and the director’s affiliation with the company.61 Additionally,
compensation consultants to directors must also meet
independence requirements.62 The SEC must issue rules on the
meaning of independence of compensation consultants, which
must be considered by compensation committees before engaging
the advisory services of consultants.63 Factors in determining the
independence of compensation committee consultants include
whether the consultant provides other services to the company,
the amount of fees paid to the consultant and the percentage of
the consultant’s total revenue from these fees, any business or
personal relationships of the consultant to the company, policies
and procedures for hiring consultants, and stock of the company
owned by the consultant.64
The D-F Act also directs that a company give its
compensation committee sole discretion to retain or to obtain
advice from the consultant.65 The company must also disclose
whether it retained a consultant and whether there are “any
conflict[s] of interest[,] and, if so, the nature of the conflict of

57 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2010); Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra
(discussing standards relating to Listed Company Audit Committee).
58 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 423–25.
59 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 423.
60 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 425.
61 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection,
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 423.
62 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.
63 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.
64 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.
65 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.

note 19, at 34–35
Act § 952; CCH
Act § 952; CCH
Act § 952; CCH
Act § 952; CCH
Act § 952; CCH
Act § 952; CCH
Act § 952; CCH
Act § 952; CCH
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interest.”66
The mandates for independent compensation
committee members and rules on hiring and disclosure of
compensation consultants are to provide investors with adequate
information to assess the reliability of compensation committee
reports.67 Some of the legislative concerns over consultants have
been addressed in earlier SEC rulemaking on compensation
committee members’ independence, and the SEC may modify or
tweak its previously issued rules on compensation committee
director independence to meet the requirements under the D-F
Act.68
H. Disclosures on Bifurcation of CEO and Chairman Positions
The D-F Act requires the SEC to develop rules that require
disclosure in annual proxy statements, which state the reasons
why a company has chosen the same person to serve as chairman
of the board of directors and CEO or why it has chosen different
individuals in these positions.69 The legislative history suggests
that Congress understood there were valid reasons for having the
same person serve as Chairman and CEO, yet recognized the
importance of independent board leadership.70 The SEC issued
rulemaking on board leadership structure calling for disclosures
on CEO and chairman roles, therefore additional SEC
rulemaking may not be required to comply with D-F Act.71
All of the D-F Act’s governance requirements cover
governance areas traditionally left to federal securities laws—
proxy rules, independent board members, and disclosure
requirements.72 What makes the federal rules on disclosing
bifurcations in board leadership new is that, unlike rules for
independent audit or compensation committee members, board
leadership structure rules address the social and psychological
reasons behind board decision-making.73
It seems almost
impossible not to disclose information on board leadership
structure without the board first engaging in a discussion about
66 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.
67 CCH ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.
68 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 47.
69 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 972; S. REP. NO.
111-176, at 147.
70 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 147.
71 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 39–45 (discussing proposed
amendments and final rules on new disclosure about board leadership and the board’s
role in risk and oversight).
72 Holly J. Gregory, Corporate Governance—United States, WEIL.COM (last visited
Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=4049.
73 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 39 (requiring companies to
disclose the reasons behind their choice of structure).
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what is the most appropriate structure to encourage frank and
open dialogue among directors. The SEC has designed rules,
which give investors information on the inherent or the
structural design of board membership, so that shareholders will
know whether a dominant CEO or leader has exerted undue
influence on board decision-making.74 The influences Congress
and the SEC seek to address are known as structural biases in
decision-making by directors and the inability of boards to
minimize the negative consequences of group-think. Part III
examines the meaning of structural bias and group think.
III. STRUCTURAL BIAS AND THE SOCIAL NATURE OF BOARDS
Social science research documents that cohesive groups, such
as boards, tend to engage in “group think” behavior and strongly
identify with the group leader.75 A dominant leader can often
manipulate the group to comply with his wishes.76 Directors thus
often conform to the social norms of “group think” and limit frank
discussion or dissent.77 Governance processes to counter the
effects of “group think” include not only independent directors,
but removing the CEO as chairman or selecting an independent
director to lead discussions with other independent directors
without the influence of the CEO.78 Boards engage in group
think when there is limited discussion of ideas and few directors
are willing to engage in critical analysis of ideas put forth by
management.79
Rakesh Khurana, a noted leadership development scholar,
and Katharina Pick, a Ph.D. candidate, in their article, The
Social Nature of Boards, outline the challenges faced by boards
as groups subject to influence by charismatic leaders.80 Professor
Khurana and Pick note the difficulty individual members of a
group face in trying to stand up to leaders and why social norms
of conformity often lead the board to acquiesce to the wishes of

Id. at 42–44.
See generally Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003).
76 Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 297–300 (2004) (discussing the duration of CEO
power and how it is obtained).
77 Id. at 295.
78 Id. at 313–14.
79 Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 724–25 (2005);
O’Connor, supra note 75, at 1238.
80 Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70 BROOK. L.
REV. 1259, 1260 (2005).
74
75
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the CEO, even when the CEO makes flawed decisions.81 CEOs
are often blinded in their decision-making by being unable to see
the shortcomings of plans and by being surrounded by
individuals unwilling or unable to challenge the prevailing views
of the CEO.82 Shareholders benefit from separating the CEO and
chairman positions or designating a lead independent director
because bifurcation affects structural biases and group think of
board decision-making. State fiduciary duty laws limit the
ability of shareholders to address issues of structural
organizational bias, thus, the D-F Act governance provisions,
combined with recent SEC rulemaking disclosure, enhance
shareholders’ rights under state corporate law, and arguably
move federal securities laws even closer to regulating state
corporate governance matters.83 It is noteworthy to look at how
Delaware, the state of choice for most public corporations,
addresses the issue of structural bias in board decision-making in
order to gain a better understanding of the limitations and
benefits of federal bifurcation disclosures.
IV. THE DELAWARE APPROACH
Two Delaware cases, Beam v. Stewart and In re Oracle Corp
Derivative Litigation, illustrate the issues faced by shareholders
when trying to argue that a board or individual directors lack
independence based on arguments of social or structural bias.84
In Beam, the shareholder brought derivative claims against
Martha Stewart and other officers and directors for a variety of
actions taken by the board after allegations of insider trading
were brought against Martha Stewart, who was chairman and
CEO, and the largest shareholder of Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. (MSO).85 It was agreed that Stewart and
another officer were not independent or disinterested for
81 Id. at 1271. See also James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85–108 (1985).
82 Cox & Munsinger, supra note 81, at 85; Khurana & Pick, supra note 80, at 1273–
74.
83 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committee, and the
Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1308 (discussing the meaning of
structural bias for special litigation committees).
84 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1040 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004) (“Shareholder
brought derivative action against corporation’s founder, officers and directors, and against
corporation as a nominal defendant, seeking relief in relation to accusations of insider
trading by founder, private sales of sizable shares of stock by some of the directors
following insider trading scandal, and board of director’s decision to provide founder with
‘split-dollar’ life insurance.”); In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917, 917
(Del. Ch. 2003) (“Shareholders brought derivative action alleging insider trading by chief
executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and two directors.”).
85 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1044.
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purposes of demand.86 The shareholders argued that other
members of the board were not independent because of either
their longstanding personal relationships with Martha Stewart,
or their indebtedness to Stewart in some personal or professional
manner.87 In affirming the Chancery Court’s conclusion that the
shareholder had failed to show facts raising a reasonable doubt
as to the independence of the named directors, the Delaware
Supreme Court stated that the court must make a fact-specific
determination “by answering the inquiries: independent from
whom and independent for what purpose? To excuse pre-suit
demand in this case, the plaintiff has the burden to plead
particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt sufficient to
rebut the presumption that [the directors were] independent of
defendant Stewart.”88 The court went on to state that the
jurisprudence balance was to deter baseless shareholder lawsuits
while
permitting
shareholders
to
demonstrate
with
particularized facts a lack of independence by directors.89
The court was unwilling to find that personal friendships or
business relationships alone result in bias enough to render a
director incapable of exercising independent judgment.90 The
court characterized the shareholders’ arguments as “structural
bias” and directly stated that while it was aware of the biases
common to boards as part of the socialization process, it was
unwilling to take notice of such arguments unless established in
appropriately plead complaints.91 The court acknowledged that
the assessment of director independence varies depending on the
state of litigation and that at the demand stage, a shareholder’s
limited discovery on independence may be “outcomedeterminative” on the issue of independence.92
In Oracle, a case distinguished in Beam, the court concluded
that close personal relationships were a factor in deciding that a
special litigation committee was not independent.93 The Oracle
board established a Special Litigation Committee (SLC) in
response to the derivative action filed by shareholders against
the officers and directors.94 The SLC recommended termination
of the litigation.95 The SLC had the burden of proof to establish

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1049–50.
Id. at 1050.
Id.
Id. at 1050–51.
Id. at 1055.
In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litig. 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Id. at 923.
Id. at 928.
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that it satisfied the independence requirements set forth in
Zapata v. Maldonado.96 Focusing on whether the SLC was
capable of being impartial and objective in reaching its decision,
the court analyzed the ties of two SLC directors, professors at
Stanford University, who were asked to investigate the conduct
of a fellow director, who also had connections to Stanford.97 The
chairman and CEO was Lawrence Ellison, who was also a large
contributor to Stanford.98
The court examined the close personal relationships among
the directors with the Stanford connections and concluded that
there was reasonable doubt as to the independence of the SLC.99
While acknowledging that the SLC had engaged in extensive
work and investigation, the court concluded that the Stanford
ties and the relationship with Ellison made the SLC directors
beholden to Ellison even though there were no financial ties.100
Focusing less on whether the directors were in fact dominated or
controlled by Ellison, but rather on knowledge of human
motivations, the court stated:
Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human
nature that simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least
sophisticated notions of the law and economics movement. . . . We
may be thankful that an array of other motivations exist that
influence human behavior; not all are any better than greed or
avarice, think of envy, to name just one. But also think of motives like
love, friendship, and collegiality, think of those among us who direct
their behavior as best they can on a guiding creed or set of moral
values.101

The court took further notice of the social behavior and
structural biases of boards by stating,
corporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed
in social institutions. Such institutions have norms, expectations
that, explicitly and implicitly, influence and channel the behavior of
those who participate in their operation. Some things are “just not
done,” or only at a cost, which might not be so severe as a loss of
position, but may involve a loss of standing in the institution. In
being appropriately sensitive to this factor, our law also cannot
assume—absent some proof of the point—that corporate directors are,
as a general matter, persons of unusual social bravery, who operate

96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id. at 929–36.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 942.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 938.
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heedless to the inhibitions that social norms generate for ordinary
folk.102

Beam and Oracle demonstrate the different approaches
taken by the Delaware courts in dealing with structural biases.
In explaining the different approaches, noting the uniqueness of
the SLC, the court in Beam writes “[u]nlike the demand-excusal
context, where the board is presumed to be independent, the SLC
has the burden of establishing its own independence by a
yardstick that must be ‘like Caesar’s wife’—‘above reproach.’”103
The court went on to state “unlike the pre-suit demand context,
the SLC analysis contemplates not only a shift in the burden of
persuasion but also the availability of discovery into various
issues, including independence.”104
When shareholders have the burden of demonstrating
independence, they must demonstrate with particularized facts
more than structural biases.105 When directors have the burden
of demonstrating independence, they must demonstrate
impartiality and courts are willing to consider structural biases
in assessing independence.106
Delaware’s approach leaves
shareholders at a disadvantage when structural biases limit the
ability of shareholders to move a derivative case forward prior to
the formation of a special litigation committee established to
evaluate the merits of a derivative claim.107
A. Federal Bifurcation Rules and Common Law Fiduciary Duty
The D-F Act requirements and SEC disclosure mandates will
require boards to evaluate and disclose its rationale for a board
structure in which the CEO also serves as chairman of the
board.108 In circumstances where the CEO is also the chairman,
under SEC rules, a company is permitted to appoint a lead
independent director.109 In such instances, company disclosures
must define the responsibilities of the lead director.110 Requiring
companies to disclose and explain its governance policies as it
relates to the CEO and chairman provides shareholders with

Id.
Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 1048–49.
Id. at 1049–51.
107 Id. at 1054.
108 For an example of recent company disclosures on board leadership see
MCDONALD’S CORP., NOTICE OF 2010 ANNUAL SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING AND PROXY
STATEMENT 2 (2010), available at http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/etc/medialib/
aboutMcDonalds/investor_relations0.Par.34096.File.dat/2010%20mcd%20proxy.pdf.
109 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 43.
110 Id.
102
103
104
105
106
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important information on the potential for the CEO to exercise
dominance over board decision-making.
Delaware currently has no legislative requirements on the
make-up of the board. Delaware common law examines director
independence under a duty of loyalty and a demand futility
analysis.111 The analysis focuses on whether a director is
interested or independent.112 In a demand futility analysis, the
court assesses whether a director is personally interested in the
outcome of the litigation, or whether the director benefits or
suffers directly from the outcome of the shareholder litigation.113
Director independence in a duty of loyalty analysis also includes
an assessment by the court of whether the director is dominated
by an interested director.114 In determining whether a director
might be beholden to an interested director, Delaware courts
have focused on whether there were financial ties between the
directors.115 Although the burden of proof depends on whether
the allegations of lack of director independence are at the
demand futility or the fiduciary analysis stage of the litigation,
Delaware relies on its business judgment rule presumption and
enhanced judicial scrutiny of board decisions in circumstances
when there is a conflict of interest or breach of the duty of
loyalty.116 Provided an independent board or a committee has
performed its duties in good faith, Delaware courts are reluctant
to substitute its judgment for that of the board.117
While Delaware law permits shareholders to raise issues of
domination in the context of assessing director independence,
Delaware’s fiduciary duty does not permit shareholders to shift
the burden to directors to demonstrate that a board leadership
structure in which the CEO is also chairman is not a conflict of
interest or otherwise a breach of the duty of loyalty.118 Provided
the directors otherwise demonstrate independence and good
faith, the board will be entitled to the business judgment rule
presumption.119 Delaware fiduciary law has done little to
address directly CEO biases and domination when the CEO holds
111 See In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 582–83 (Del. Ch.
2007) (discussing the Aronson test for demand futility and the test for determining
whether a duty of loyalty claim survives a motion to dismiss); In re Oracle Derivative
Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 939 (Del. Ch. 2003) (discussing the standards set forth in Aronson v.
Lewis and Rales v. Blasband).
112 In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d at 582.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 In re Oracle Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d at 936.
116 In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d at 582.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 584.
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both positions.120 With improved federal disclosures on why a
CEO holds dual positions or appointment of independent lead
director, investors can evaluate structural biases in board
decision-making.121 More importantly, it is the opportunity for
directors to more fully account for the effects of group think on
board decision-making by understanding what social science data
reveals about how decisions are made in groups.122
B. Bifurcation: The Benefit to Shareholders
Prior to passage of the D-F Act and SEC rules on bifurcation,
shareholders had limited information on board leadership and
structural bias.123 Federal rules requiring disclosures of board
leadership structure benefit shareholders by not only providing
better information on board structure, but also by requiring
directors to assess its board structure for structural biases and
independence.124 Engaging in a review of its board leadership
structure improves directors’ fiduciary obligations by ensuring
independent directors are able to engage in frank discord without
undue management influences.125 Although companies are not
required to separate the CEO and chairman’s job, by forcing
disclosures, the board must at least engage in an analysis of how
its board structure works.126 Separating the role of the CEO and
chairman improves corporate governance by recognizing the
social dynamic of board interaction in ways state fiduciary
analysis does not.127 Having the board justify its leadership
structure also benefits shareholders in situations where
shareholder derivative claims for breach of fiduciary limit the
ability of shareholders to use discovery to uncover structural
biases.128 Shareholders may be better able to demonstrate
demand futility when the board has disclosed its rationale for a
leadership structure that does not separate the roles of chairman
and CEO.

120 Langevoort, supra note 76, at 289–91 (discussing capture and the balance of power
between the board and CEO); Paredes, supra note 79, at 724–25 (discussing how
Delaware corporate law provides that the “[t]he business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of [the] board of directors,” and
thus the CEO has control because the board delegates it to him).
121 Joseph McCafferty, Splitting the CEO and the Chair, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(June 12, 2009, 2:08 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/jun2009/
ca20090612_359612.htm.
122 See supra note 85, and accompanying text.
123 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 4.
124 Id. at 4–5.
125 Id. at 43–44.
126 Id. at 44.
127 McCafferty, supra note 121.
128 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 44.
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Bifurcation disclosure requirements are a positive benefit for
state corporate governance.
Until state corporate law, in
particular Delaware, begins to reexamine its rules on board
structure, federal securities laws are likely to continue to
legislate disclosure requirements to address issues of board
group think in decision-making. Bifurcation of the CEO and
Chairman moves a bit closer to blurring the complementary
balance between federal and state law on governance.
CONCLUSION
In 2003, Professor Roe129 wrote an article in which he argued
that the real competition in corporate governance was not
between Delaware and other states, but between Delaware and
federal securities laws.130
I agree with Professor Roe’s
observation. Federal rules continue to use disclosure mandates
to affect behavior of corporate managers in their relationship
with shareholders. The politics of responding to corporate crises
is unlikely to see Congress or the SEC limit its role in effecting
corporate governance changes for the public corporation.
Congress sought to address specific corporate failures in the D-F
Act—governance failures such as highly paid executive
compensation in the wake of corporate failures, compensation
committees rewarding executives for taking excessive risk, and
directors seemingly unwilling to engage in critical analysis of the
CEO or management’s decisions.131
Do the new federal disclosure requirements on corporate
governance benefit shareholders under state law? I believe the
short answer to this question is yes; however, I am not convinced
that the disclosure requirements can achieve improvements in
board leadership without a corresponding shift in state corporate
governance. The new rules will force the boards of public
companies to engage in greater oversight of risk and disclose
such risk. More importantly, the disclosures on board leadership
structure will likely increase the overall independence of the
board, allowing for improvements in frank discussion among
board members. Where state fiduciary duty does not address or,
as in Delaware, varies depending on the stage of shareholder
litigation, shareholders are likely to face litigation disadvantages
in a demand futility analysis for independence. State fiduciary
129 Professor Mark Roe is a noted scholar, who writes in the areas of corporate law
and governance. He is the author of Strong Managers Weak Owners: The Political Roots
of American Corporate Finance. Professor Roe is currently a professor at Harvard Law
School.
130 Roe, supra note 4, at 592.
131 McCafferty, supra note 121.
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duty analysis will continue to be supplemented by federal rules of
disclosures. As Congress responds to specific corporate failures,
state corporate law can respond to investor concerns with a more
methodological, nuanced analysis of corporate conduct. Courts
will respect good faith efforts by independent boards, and
shareholders can be informed of how compensation committees
and their consultants make their decisions. Boards who have an
independent source of information with new rules on
compensation consultants will continue to have the protection of
business judgment rule. So in the end, notwithstanding federal
laws’ increasing push on state corporate law, the complimentary
balance of federal and state law remains.

